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Abstract: 
The major competing statistical paradigms share a common remarkable but unremarked thread: 
in many of their inferential applications, different probability interpretations are combined. How 
this plays out in different theories of inference depends on the type of question asked. We 
distinguish four question types: confirmation, evidence, decision, and prediction. We show that 
Bayesian confirmation theory mixes what are intuitively “subjective” and “objective” 
interpretations of probability, whereas the likelihood-based account of evidence melds three 
conceptions of what constitutes an “objective” probability.   
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Statistical Inference and the Plethora of Probability Paradigms: A Principled Pluralism 
  
 
  “[T]he house of statistics is divided according to the interpretation of 
probability that is adopted. We need to settle on an interpretation of 
probability in order to settle on a global approach to statistical inference. 
…Given the approach to probability that we settle on, we shall see that 
each of these approaches to statistics can find its useful place in our 
inferential armament.” (Henry Kyburg, Jr., and Choh Man Teng, 
2001. Uncertain Inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. p.196, emphasis added) 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Notions and notations for subjective and objective probability 
Many statisticians and philosophers of science are pragmatic pluralists when it comes to 
statistical inference. That is, they think that different problems require now one, now another 
statistical paradigm for their resolution. Some problems lend themselves to a Bayesian approach, 
others to an error-statistical approach, still others to an evidentialist approach and its likelihoodist 
special case. Ostensibly, each approach has embedded within it a unique interpretation of the 
probability operator, some “subjective,” others “objective.”  
In this paper we argue a two-fold thesis: that there are “subjective” and “objective” 
elements within some individual paradigms and that the “objective” elements themselves often 
meld distinguishable conceptions of objectivity.1 In order to avoid equivocation, a notational 
                                                          
1 Others have made something like this general point. Ian Hacking (2001), for example, distinguishes (p. 140) 
between “frequency dogmatists” and “belief dogmatists” and, rejecting the adoption of one position or the other, 
urges an “eclectic” approach that selects “what seems best from various styles, doctrines, ideas, and methods.” His 
point differs from ours, however, in that it (a) resembles the pluralistic pragmatism mentioned above, and (b) is not 
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distinction among probability operators should be made. Since we restrict our attention here to 
two statistical paradigms, Bayesian and Likehoodist, we distinguish between two such operators, 
Prc, for credal probabilities (which for Bayesians measure or represent degrees of belief for some 
agent that a proposition is true), and Pri, for implicit probabilities which represent a formal 
“deductive” relation, either analytic or algorithmic, between a model and a potential data set2. By 
a “model,” we mean a mathematical entity that specifies a probability distribution over a range of 
data which might be collected.3 Models need to be distinguished from hypotheses which, unlike 
models, are statements that do not necessarily contain a quantitative assertion about how 
probable data are under them.4 
For the sake of simplicity, we contrast paradigmatic “credel” and “non-credel” 
probabilities. It follows from our characterization that credal probabilities are temporally-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
argued for or developed in any detail. Similarly, Donald Gillies (2003) distinguishes between subjective and 
objective interpretations and argues that both are needed, the former in the social, the latter in the natural sciences. 
But his position (a) again resembles “pluralistic pragmatism” in the sense that either subjectivity or objectivity is a 
feature of entire statistical paradigms and are neither mixed nor melded within them, (b) argues implausibly that 
there is something inherently “subjective” about the social sciences, “objective” about the natural sciences. 
Although we won’t support the claim here, no such (principled) distinction between sciences is plausible.   
2 The notion of “Implicit probability” is related to but not simply a special instance of what Hájek 2012) calls 
“Quasi-logical probability,” a generalization of the intuitional core of Carnap’s  (1950) logical theory.  Both 
construe “probability” in formal and non-credal terms.. But “implicit probability” in our sense has a narrower 
definition because it is restricted to probabilities deriving from models and does not include probabilities that flow 
logically from hypotheses. More important, Hájek’s quasi-logical concept “is meant to measure objective evidential 
support relations” between data and hypotheses considered singly. In contrast, for us evidential support relations are 
comparative measures among models/hypotheses.  An example is the ratio of likelihoods between hypotheses 
considered pairwise. Still more important, Hájek’s notion (like that of Carnap’s before him) fuses “evidence” and 
“confirmation” (e.g., “the logical theory seeks to encapsulate in full generality the degree of support or confirmation 
that a piece of evidence confers upon a given hypothesis H…”), whereas it is one of our main aims to distinguish 
sharply between them.  
3 It is unfortunate that this use of the word “model,” common among statisticians, has little in common with the 
same term used by philosophers and logicians to designate a domain of individuals and an assignment function 
such that all of the sentences in a specified vocabulary and formulated in a canonical first-order way are true. On 
the latter usage, truth is relative to a model and a variable assignment, on the former it is not. What the two 
usages share is that the relationship is model-relative. This is the sole respect in which models on either usage are 
in any sense “subjective.” In the case of statistical inference, both data and the models generating them must be 
described in a particular way. 
4 As a didactic example, an economic model might say that the price of apples is linearly related (with specified 
intercept, slope and error variance) to the supply of apples, while an economic hypothesis might only state that 
the price of apples decreases with their supply. 
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indexed; a believes that p is true to some degree r at time t.5 Non-credal probabilities may attach 
to data and models that contain temporal variables, but the probabilities themselves are not 
similarly indexed. The relation between models and data is both temporally-invariant and agent-
independent.  
Nothing in our discussion implies that there are no more than two viable statistical 
paradigms or interpretations of the probability operator, or that there are not other and more 
subtle ways in which to characterize “credel” and “non-credel.”6 Our argument rather is that a 
distinction must be made between probability types even as the solution of certain types of 
statistical questions requires their joint invocation.7 
1.2 Fundamental Methodological Questions 
We begin with two pre-theoretical and fundamental methodological questions, (i) the 
confirmation question (CQ), and (ii) the evidence question (EQ).8 Contending parties in what are 
sometimes termed “the statistics wars” usually agree on the centrality and significance of these 
questions, but disagree about the extent to which they are distinct and how best handle to them. 
More specifically, the questions are: 
(i) (CQ) Given the data, what should we believe, and to what degree? 
(ii) (EQ) Do the data provide evidence for model M1 against an alternative model M2, and how 
much? 
     To better appreciate the rich tapestry of current statistical methodology, we will raise two 
more questions, (iii) the decision question (DQ), and (iv) the prediction question (PQ). They are: 
(iii) (DQ) Given the data what should we do? 
                                                          
5 In his seminal (1931), Ramsey draws attention to the necessity of time-stamping belief-probabilities so as to allow 
for the consistency of the kinematic changes they undergo as agents accumulate new data. Although we have not 
complicated the notation to indicate it, credal probability operators in what follows are assumed to have a temporal 
subscript.  
6 Use of jargon here should help to pare back at least some of the misleading connotations clinging to the more 
conventional vocabulary of ‘subjective,” “objective,” etc., which is misleading at best. It is one of our main aims to 
replace this simple-minded way of talking with something more granular and perspicacious.  
7 Kyburg and Meng (2001, p. 196) say rightly that “the house of statistics is divided according to the interpretation 
of probability that is adopted.” But they give no reason for claiming in the next sentence that “We need to settle 
on an interpretation of probability in order to settle on a global approach to statistical inference.” Granted that a 
house divided cannot stand, but there need be no civil war among its inhabitants if each has a role to play distinct 
from and in harmony with the others’ roles.  
8 Following Royall (1997). 
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(iv) (PQ) Given the data, what is the evidence for the greater predictive accuracy of one model 
against its alternative? 
1.3 Outline  
            In section 2.1, we discuss both subjective Bayesian (hereafter Bayesian) confirmation 
theory and the likelihoodist account of evidence to show that subjective Bayesians are well-
equipped to address CQ, and likelihoodists like Royall are equally well-equipped to address EQ. 
In section 2.2, we will discuss how a mixing of probability interpretations occurs in the Bayesian 
account, a melding of them in the Likelihoodist.9  
 In section 2.3, we show how Bayesians are able to address DQ. In the same section, we discuss 
how an evidentialist would respond to the DQ. In section 2.4, we broach the evidentialist’s 
exploitation of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to address PQ. We also examine issues 
concerning the consistency of AIC and its connection to an evidential treatment of PQ. We point 
out that the term “consistency” applies differently to the EQ and PQ questions. To defend our 
contention that major applications of statistical inference make use of different types of 
probabilities, in section 2.5 we show how those two accounts - Bayesian and evidential - also 
involve fusions of probability interpretations.  In section 3, we introduce several corollaries that 
flow from our theses. One is an unconventional epistemic stance on the interpretational issue:  
we hold that even with regard to a single type of question, there has to be a mixing or melding of 
different conceptions of probability. Another corollary is that our pluralism is principled; it has 
to do with the type of statistical question being asked and not with a particular problem to be 
solved. 
                                                          
9 Although we are going to argue that both statistical paradigms combine different types or aspects of probability we 
will see that the manner in which each paradigm combines them is slightly different from the other. To distinguish 
the Bayesian mixing of probabilities from the Likelihoodist (or Evidentialist), we use “melding” for the latter, 
keeping in mind that often ordinary language is not adequately subtle to keep them separate. One purpose of the 
paper is to make the distinction between them clearer. 
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2 Distinctions and Concordances 
2.1 Bayesian Account of Confirmation and Likelihood Account of Evidence10 
     The account of confirmation we take as paradigm involves a relation, C(D, M, B) among data 
D, model M, and the agent’s background information B.11 Here, “data” are taken to be sets of 
observations collected by a defined procedure and described in a uniform way. This account of 
confirmation incorporates the basic rules of probability theory, including the rule of conditional 
probability, an interpretation of the probability operator as a measure of personal belief, and 
some reasonable constraints on one’s a priori degree of belief that whatever empirical model is 
under consideration is true. We assume that if learning from experience is to be possible, one of 
these constraints is that the agent should not have an a priori belief that an empirical model is 
true to degree 1, i.e., could not possibly be false, or false to degree 0, i.e., that it could not 
possibly be true. Empirical models are never more than merely probable. This said, an agent 
learns from experience by up-dating her degrees of belief that a model is true by conditioning on 
the data as she gathers them, i.e., in accord with the principle, derivable from the axioms of 
probability theory and the definition of conditional probability, that Prc(M│D) = Prc(M)Prc(M & 
D)/Prc(D). Assuming that Prc (D) ≠ 0, her degree of belief in M after the data are known is given 
by Prc(M│D), called the posterior probability of the model, and calculated using Bayes Theorem: 
cPr ( | )M D  = c
c
Pr ( ) Pr ( | )
Pr ( )
iM D M
D
×    
The prior probability, Prc(M), of a model depends on the agent’s degree of belief that the 
model is true before new or additional data bearing on the model have been gathered. The 
marginal probability, Prc(D), represents the probability that D would obtain, averaged over all 
the models being considered. That is ( ) ( ) ( )Pr Pr Pr |c c i i i
i
D M D M=∑ . We call the following the 
Confirmation Account: 
 
                                                          
10 “Confirmation” and “evidence” are often used interchangeably in discussions of the ways in which data “support” 
hypotheses (see footnote 21). It is a main aim of our monograph (xxx) to show how and why they must be 
distinguished. It is not to our present purpose to repeat that demonstration here. We have been asked whether a 
distinction of this kind reforms statistical practice. It is already beginning to do so. See (Klement, 2017) and, for an 
application of an element of our argument (Pulgarin, et. al., 2018). 
11 Except when it is important, we leave out reference to the background information in what follows. 
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 D confirm M if and only if cPr (M│D) > cPr (M).12  
This is a qualitative comparison of the probabilities of a model before and after data have been 
collected at any given time.  The bi-conditional forms the intuitional basis of the conception of 
confirmation.  The account rests, as do most Bayesian conceptions of confirmation as a relation 
between probability measures, on the following principle: for any M, D1, D2,  the confirmation 
(disconfirmation) of M in the light of D1 is greater (less) than the confirmation(disconfirmation) 
of  M in the light of D2 just in case cPr (M│D1) > (<) cPr (M│D2).13  The confirmation account 
can with ease be made quantitative. There are alternative ways to measure the degree to which a 
model is confirmed, but a common metric is in terms of the difference between the model’s prior 
and posterior probabilities.14 It is customarily normative as well; one should believe that a model 
is true to the degree that it has been confirmed. 
       Evidence, construed as an answer to the second question (EQ), involves a comparison of the 
merits of two models, M1, and M2 (possibly, but not necessarily, ~M1) relative to the data D and 
background information B.15  
     D is evidence for M1 & B as against M2 & B if and only if  1 2Pr ( | & ) Pr ( | & )i iD M B D M B>                                                                
                                                          
12 Or as it is sometimes called, “the positive relevance condition.” See (Salmon, 1983) for an extended argument in 
behalf of the primacy of this condition, and hence of the indispensability of prior probabilities, in an analysis of 
confirmation. 
13Following (Crupi, Chater, and Tenori, 2013) whose article includes a long list of Bayesians who subscribe to this 
principle.  
14 Eells (1982), Gillies (1986), Earman (1992), Jeffrey (1992), and Rosenkrantz (1994) are among those who defend 
the “difference measure” of “evidential support” (identified by us as a measure of “confirmation,” not of 
“evidence”). Another standard measure is the posterior/prior ratio. See footnote 18 on the frequent but misguided 
claim that this PPR measure is equivalent to the LR measure of evidence. 
15 We will only include B in our initial formulation and subsume it into the model in our later discussion. It is 
important to note that “ ̴ M” is ambiguous as between a specific alternative to the model of interest and a set of 
models (M1,…,Mi,…Mz). Deborah Mayo (Mayo and Spanos 2006) and other error-statisticians and the subjective 
Bayesian Colin Howson (2013, 2016) allege that likelihood accounts cannot account for composite hypotheses. 
According to Howson in particular, an account such as ours, which maintains that the values of likelihoods and 
hence of their ratios do not depend on a consideration of prior probabilities, is mistaken since we cannot calculate 
the Pr(D│M) without knowing the priors of each of the component models. The point is easily deflected. For 
evidential purposes it is effective to define the generalized likelihood  Lg(D;{M1,…,Mi,…,Mz}) as max(L(D;Mi). 
Using “;” rather than “│” to express the relationship between data and model helps avoid the tempting but mistaken 
equation of likelihoods to [Pr(M│D)Pr(M)]/Pr(D)] and a misreading of P(M) in belief-probability terms. The use of 
generalized likelihoods to test composite hypotheses goes back to the early stages of modern frequentist statistics 
(Neyman and Pearson, 1933).  More discussion of the use of generalized evidence functions for inference for 
composite models can be found in Taper and Lele (2011), Bickel (2012), and our Monograph (2016) 
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Call this the Likelihoodist’s Evidence Account.16 It serves to characterize data which, in context, 
play an evidential role.   
The quantity Pri(D│M) is often referred to in the philosophical literature as the 
“likelihood.” While numerically the likelihood of the model given the data is proportional to the 
probability of the data given the model, likelihood and probability are not the same thing; 
likelihood is considered a function of the model, whereas the probability is considered a function 
of the data. We here adopt the common philosophical notation of denoting the likelihood by 
Pri(D│M) rather than the common statistical notation of L(M; D),17 but do not mean to imply 
that the model M needs to be considered a random variable. Because credal probabilities are not 
involved in the calculation, the likelihood is objective.  
As with the confirmation account, this statement is initially qualitative, but a commonly 
used quantitative measure of the degree of evidence vis-a-vis one model over another is the 
numerical ratio of the likelihoods18 for the two models.  Note in this connection that  if 1 < LR ≤ 
8, then D is often said to provide “weak” evidence for M1 against M2, while when LR > 8, D 
provides “strong” evidence for M1  over M2  (Royall, 1997). This cut-off point is sometimes 
determined contextually by the relevant scientific communities and may vary depending on the 
nature of the problem confronting the investigator, but it follows a statistical practice common 
                                                          
16 Anthony Edwards (1972) was the first statistician to make explicit the connection between the likelihood ratio and 
what he calls “degree of support” and we, following Royall (1997), more narrowly call “evidence.”The LR is a 
special case of “evidence functions” useful for specified as opposed to estimated models Lele (2004). For simplicity, 
we frame our philosophical arguments using the LR as an exemplar of this more general class of statistical 
functions. It is important to note that we differ sharply from Edwards as concerns the range of what he calls the 
“Likelihood Axiom.” In his words (1972, p. 31, emphasis in original): “Within the framework of a statistical model, 
all the information which the data provide concerning the relative merits of two hypotheses is contained in the 
likelihood ratio of those hypotheses on the data, and the likelihood ratio is to be interpreted as the degree to which 
the data support one hypothesis against the other.” We disagree that “all” of the information which the data provide 
is contained in the likelihood ratio (which is to say that the notion of “support” is ambiguous). Rather, we 
distinguish “confirmation” from “evidence” in the attempt to show that both concepts must be incorporated in an 
adequate account of statistical inference/hypothesis testing.  I.J. Good (1983) uses the likelihood ratio in the way we 
do to characterize what he calls “the weight of evidence.” 
17 In the eyes of many statisticians, this notation signals the difference between “probability” and “likelihood” as 
two different concepts. More than a simple notational difference is involved. The “│” notation indicates 
conditioning on a random variable, i.e., in the case of Pr(D│M)  the model is a random variable, while Pr(D; M) 
indicates that the probability of the data is conditioned on a model that is considered fixed.  
18
 Or the logarithm of the likelihood ratio. See Eells and Fitelson (2002, p. 9, n. 10) for a reason to use logged 
versions of the quantitative measures of what we term “confirmation” and “evidence.”  Nothing in our discussion 
turns on it.  The respective ordinal structures remain the same. 
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among investigators.19 It follows from the Likelihoodist account of evidence that the range of 
values for the LR can vary from 0 to ∞ inclusive       
       On this account of evidence, a model is defined as an idealized data-generating mechanism. 
Observed data support model1 over model2 if the potential data generated by model1 are by some 
measure closer to the observed data than the data generated by model2. Thus on this account, 
data provide evidence for one model against its alternative independent of what the agent knows 
or believes about either the available data or the models being tested.  
     Based on our discussion so far, there are two ways to distinguish “confirmation” from 
“evidence.”20 First, confirmation is psychological, involving as it does changes in an agent’s 
personal degree of belief that a model is true, and evidence is “logical,” an agent-independent 
relation between models and data. It follows that confirmation is also “kinematic,” beliefs re-
adjusted over time as data are accumulated, evidence is “static,” a timeless relation between 
models and data (although the evidence will change if different data are considered). Second, 
confirmation on the standard Bayesian account is normative in that an agent’s belief adjustments 
should cohere with the axioms of probability theory and their implications, evidence on the 
likelihoodist account is merely descriptive of relations obtaining between models and data. One 
                                                          
19 Royall (1997) points out that the benchmark value = 8, or any value in that neighborhood, is widely shared. In 
fact, the value 8 is closely related to the Type I error-rate 0.05 in classical statistics and to an information criterion 
value of 2. See Taper (2004) and Taper and Ponciano (2016) for more on this issue. 
20 Ellery Eells and Brandon Fitelson (2002) distinguish these and other similar measures, but assume that they all 
measure the same thing, viz., the degree of “evidential support” which data confer on hypotheses. From our point of 
view, three features of their discussion are note-worthy. First, our “confirmation” and “evidence” measures score 
equally well with respect to the criteria of adequacy they propose and better than any of the other traditional 
measures, e.g. Keynes’ (1921), Carnap’s (1962, #67) and Christensen’s (1999), considered.  Second, although Eells 
and Fitelson describe all of the measures evaluated as “non-equivalent,” they don’t specify in what respects. Some 
have argued that Keynes’ posterior-prior ratio measure (PPR) is equal to the LR measure and therefore precludes the 
necessity of a separate account of evidence (among the most recent, Evans, 2016).  But the claim is misguided. The 
LR is equal to (Prc(M1│D)/Pr(M) only when Pr(D)/Pr(D│ ̴ M) is close to 1. That is, [Pr(D│M)/Pr(D│ ̴M)] = 
Pr(M│D)/Pr(M) x  [Pr(D) x Pr(D/  ̴M)] ≈ 1. Otherwise, the two measures, LR and PPR, yield different values, over 
and above the fact that in our view they differ conceptually. Others (e.g., Howson, 2016) note that the two measures 
are equivalent in the sense that whenever data confirm a hypothesis on our account they at the same time provide 
evidence for it. It is indeed easy to show that Pr(H│D) > Pr(H) iff Pr(D│H)/Pr(D│H’) > 1, but this equivalence 
holds only of the qualitative measures of confirmation and evidence, is true only on the condition that H and H’ are 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, and, most important, is not linear, i.e., in individual cases the difference 
between posterior and prior probabilities may be small and the likelihood ratio large and conversely (one reason for 
distinguishing them). Third, Eells and Fitelson note in passing (2001, pp. 130-131) that “we define and label the 
pertinent measures of evidential support … where ‘Pr’ denotes probability, on some appropriate interpretation, 
usually a ‘subjective’ or ‘logical’ interpretation.” I.e., they apparently assume that whatever the measure at stake, the 
probability operators within it are to be given a univocal interpretation. On our argument, this is not the case, and the 
various interpretations within particular measures should, be distinguished conceptually and identified notationally 
to avoid confusion and to make the meanings of “subjective” and “objective” more nuanced as the statistics wars 
grind on,.     
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of the consequences of the distinction between confirmation and evidence is that in the case of 
confirmation, there is room for rational disagreement between two agents to the extent that their 
priors differ, whereas since the likelihood function is based on the mathematical calculation of a 
model, there is no place for any such rational disagreement in the case of evidence.21 
2.2 Two Accounts and Probability Interpretation Complexity 
         We will argue that adequate accounts of confirmation and evidence presuppose different 
concepts of “probability” and therefore different readings of the probability operator in our 
various conditions and equations. Here probability operators apply to “events,” “models,” and 
“propositions.” Our view is that one needs to mix or meld probabilities of different kinds (where 
the different usages “mix” or “meld” single out which account we address),   and not rely on one 
to the exclusion of the others, even within statistical paradigms. As we will now show, to do 
otherwise would be to seek an overly monistic methodology. 
2.2.1 Subjective confirmation     
 Consider first the Bayesian account of confirmation. It is informed by a subjective or 
psychological understanding of what a “probability” measures. D confirm M just in case an 
agent’s prior degree of belief that M is true is raised. The degree to which D confirm M is 
measured by the extent to which the degree of belief has been raised. The probabilities involved 
have to do with beliefs, and are in this sense “subjective.” But determining an agent’s degree of 
belief that a model is true given the data, Prc(M│D,) requires determining the likelihood of M on 
D, L(M;D) is proportional to Pri(D|M), which is independent of an agent’s belief and therefore 
objective.  
One possible response to this claim is that the likelihood function is mistakenly construed 
as objective; it needs to be construed as a conditional belief-probability in which the probability 
operator is still to be understood in credal terms. It is of course possible to do so. 
                                                          
21 Although our argument for making the distinction has to do with the clarification it introduces into discussions of 
statistical inference and not with the ways in which the terms “confirmation” and “evidence” are commonly used, 
one can detect an intuitional bias for it in the literature. Thus John Vickers (1988, p. 81, our emphasis): “As far as 
evidence is concerned, for logicism the support of probability judgments is logical and definitional. Frequentism is 
explicit that probability statements are confirmed by statements of finite relative frequencies.” Although at other  
places (e.g., p. 93) Vickers blurs the confirmation/evidence distinction, and the contrast he draws here between 
“logicism” and “frequentism” is not quite ours, “evidence” in  this passage is a formal or logical relation, 
“confirmation” not.   See Eells  (1985) and Fitelson  (2000) for discussions of the “confirmation”/”evidence” 
terminology as it is used in the literature. Like almost all philosophers and Bayesian statisticians, Eells and Fitelson 
themselves use the terms interchangeably (2002, p. 129, n. 1). 
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David Lewis has proposed a well-known way. He suggests that when the chance 
probability of a proposition, A, is externally and reliably available, one needs to set an agent’s 
subjective probabilities, Prc(A|M) = Pri(A|M), where M is a statistical model (Lewis,1980). Lewis 
thinks that this alignment of subjective probability with objective chance is possible if we adopt 
the Principal Principle (PP). The idea behind this principle is that when we have the likelihood 
of a model22 given the data available we should set an agent’s subjective probability of the data 
given the model equal to its objective likelihood. This alignment of the subjective probability 
with the objective chance23 allows us to treat both probabilities - likelihood functions and prior 
probabilities - in the application of the Bayes theorem as credal ( for a justification of the PP, see 
Pettigrew, 2016).24  
In practice but often implicitly, Bayesians typically presuppose the Principal Principle 
and align objective likelihoods and subjective probabilities in this way.25 The apparent aim is to 
avoid equivocation, i.e., to interpret the probability operators in Bayes Theorem in a consistently 
personal-belief way, in particular to treat the posterior probability in it as credal. But no 
equivocation results if (a) credal and non-credal probability operators are clearly distinguished, 
(b) it is assumed that subjectivity spreads through a compound probability statement like 
falsehood through conjunctions and truth through disjunctions. Thus we write Bayes Theorem as 
Prc(M│D) = Prc(M)Pri(D│M)/Prc(D) and understand that although the calculation of the posterior 
probability incorporates an objective likelihood, nevertheless it results in the adjustment of a 
personal-belief probability. Moreover, this sort of adjustment of our personal beliefs, quite apart 
from any commitment to a statistical paradigm, seems to proceed in just this way, by mixing 
                                                          
22 Our use of the term “model” aligns with Lewis’ use of the term “proposition.” 
23 Which is possible only by way of the stipulation that “credence [be] conditional on the truth,” i.e., on all of the 
“evidence” that has been collected. This stipulation, characteristic of what might be called “strong objective 
Bayesianism,” is critiqued in our paper (2010).  From the perspective of our present argument, the strong objective 
Bayesian conflates agent-invariance (everyone with the same prior) and agent-independence (likelihoods are belief-
free). In the penultimate section of this paper, we take up questions concerning agent-invariance and “Bayesian 
convergence” in more detail.   
24 There is a long tradition in statistics and philosophy in which even those who are considered non-Bayesians like 
Fisher, Efron, Kyburg, and Sober always recommend the use of Bayes theorem when prior probabilities are 
frequency-based. However, they are critical of the use of the theorem when prior probabilities are subjectively 
grounded.  So, when both probabilities (prior probabilities and the likelihood function) are objectively given, then, 
according to the Principal Principle, the agent should adjust her subjective probabilities according to the available 
objective probabilities. 
25 Blurring the distinction between confirmation and evidence in the process. See Lewis (1980, 285): “As new 
evidence arrives, our credence in [particular or general propositions about chances] should wax and wane in 
accordance with Bayesian confirmation theory.” 
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together data, models, and logical relations between them. At least, the adjustment of beliefs 
required by Bayesians would seem to be “rational” if we do so. 
Of course, it is possible to take the model itself to be about credences. However, since the 
values of the probabilities are specified in the model, there will be no disagreement about the 
likelihoods when people have different beliefs, because although the prior and posterior 
probability operators embedded in Bayes Theorem are given a consistently credal reading, the 
likelihood component of that Theorem will be in a straightforward  sense “agent-independent”26.          
        In order to make the case that credal and non-credal interpretations are mixed in the 
Bayesian account of confirmation we have taken as paradigm, we must expand our 
characterization of objectivity as “agent-independent”. Doing so requires taking a closer look at   
the likelihood account of evidence and has as a corollary a further distinction between senses of 
“objectivity.” In the process it will allow us to clarify different but equally indispensable 
conceptions of “non-credal” probability.  
We have already argued that the likelihood account of evidence makes no use of belief-
probabilities and in this sense is thoroughly objective. But more must be said to indicate why this 
claim is something more than an obitur dictum. The likelihood of a model given the data is an 
essential component of the account. For simplicity's sake, we identify it as proportional to the 
conditional probability, Pri(D|M), where  "D" stands for a random variable that can take on any 
value that can potentially be generated by model M. What data could be realized a priori 
depends on what sorts of models we have proposed. The relationship between a model and its 
unrealized data is deductive in the sense that M entails the distribution of "D" for a given 
specification of “M”, and “D”. One could come up with an open-ended number of distinct 
models, M1, M2, M3, ...Mk. Let's assume M1 says that the coin has a probability of 0.7 to land 
heads up. Assume further that M2 says that it has probability 0.4, M3 says that it has probability 
                                                          
26 We are hardly the first to point out that the likelihoods in Bayes Theorem constitute an objective component in it. 
Isaac Levi (1967), for example makes just this point, that likelihoods are fixed and agent-invariant, and in this sense 
“objective,” and unlike variable conditional probabilities that are agent-dependent. But for him and other Bayesians, 
likelihood probabilities are nonetheless credal. For another example of trying to have it both ways, see James 
Hawthorne (1994). In his term of art, likelihoods are “fairly objective,” (our emphasis) but as he goes on to make 
clear (p. 241), “they are the means by which evidence affects inductive support.” In other words, they provide the 
inferential tie between data and model in just the same way that logic generally considered provides the inferential 
tie between premises and conclusions quite independent of what anyone knows or believes. On our view, the 
Bayesian attempt to “have it both ways,” i.e., to claim that likelihoods are “objective” but nonetheless credal 
depends on conflating agent-independence with agent-invariance. We return to this mistaken conflation in the 
section on “Further Corollaries” below. 
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0.6, M4 says that it has probability 0.5, and so on. Given these models, before any actual data 
have been observed, each will tell us how probable any set of observations would be under the 
model. So, the relationship between M1 and D is completely deductive. So, too, are the 
relationships between other competing models and D.  
Now assume that a real coin has been flipped. Further assume that out of 100 flips, 58 of 
them have landed with heads and the rest are tails. Let's call the data set d1 58 heads and 42 tails. 
Even though d1 is a real world data set, the relationships expressed via Pri(D=d1|M1), …, 
Pri(D=d1|Mk) continue to be deductive. The expressions Pri(D=d1|Mj) simply ask what the 
probability deductively calculated from model Mj would be if D had the value d1. We find that 
each model tells us how probable those data are under that model, although the probability 
values will vary from one model to the next. For the four models we have explicitly listed, we 
have Pri(D=d1|M1)=0.0032, Pri(D=d1|M2)=0.00011, Pri(D=d1|M3)=0.074, and 
Pri(D=d1|M4)=0.022.  M3 has the highest likelihood and is thus best supported by the data 
gathered. Yet the LR of M3 to M4 of 3.32 only indicates weak evidence for M3 over M4 after the 
coin has been flipped. But, regardless of any observed realization, the relationships between each 
possible model and possible outcomes are themselves deductive.  Given any model, in this 
framework there is always a derivable countable frequency-based probability, Pri, (Hájek, 2012) 
connecting the possible outcomes to the model. That is to say, the probability of outcomes are 
the proportion of times each possible outcome would occur if the random processes of the model 
were to be repeated an infinite number of times. 
2.2.2 Propensity as an Objective Probability 
In the real world, there is a tendency on the part of objects in standard conditions to 
behave in routine ways (Peirce, 1878; Popper, 1957, 1959; Hájek, 2012).  This natural tendency 
of objects and conditions is called their propensity, and has long been characterized as a 
probability.  Notationally, we designate this form of probability as Prn.  The propensity of a coin 
to land heads or tails in a particular flipping experiment is exhibited in a sequence of flips; out of 
100 flips, 58 come up heads, for example, and 42 tails. We have no way to know for sure the true 
nature of the coin, but we can estimate it via a finite empirical frequency (Hàjek, 2012).  This is 
yet another conception of probability, which we designate Prf.  Empirical finite frequencies can 
be thought of as estimates of natural propensities. For our purposes in this paper, propensity and 
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frequency conceptions are, like the conception of implicit probability, brought together under the 
heading of “non-credal probability.”   
It is natural to assume that the tendency of a model to generate a particular sort or set of 
data represents a causal tendency on the part of natural objects represented in the model to have 
particular properties or behavioral patterns. This tendency or “causal power” can be both 
represented and sometimes explained by a corresponding model. In our view, a fully objective 
account of evidence requires that we must make this realist assumption and thus take model 
probabilities as modeled propensities.  
Very briefly, then, evidence is “fully objective” not only insofar as its characterization is 
not in any way a function of prior (personal) probabilities, for as noted the likelihoods are 
already  fixed by the model and thus  agent-independent, but also to the extent that it provides us 
with information about objects in the world. We might put this by way of a formula: objectivity 
requires reality as well as independence. Reality, in this case, amounts to propensities on the part 
of natural objects to behave in particular ways in certain circumstances, quite apart from what we 
might believe about them. The aim of science is to identify and where possible to explain them. 
Again very briefly, fully objective probabilities are thus modeled propensities.27 
   According to the propensity interpretation of probability,28 the probability of an event is 
a dispositional property of the process that generates that event.29 In this case, the probability of 
a coin’s landing heads estimated from a sequence of repeated flips is 0.58.  It is then reasonable 
to assume that the true propensity is something near 0.58. The only way we have of knowing 
what the propensity (or tendency) of the coin is to estimate it through finite empirical 
frequencies. 
                                                          
27 A more extended version of this argument can be found in (xxx, 1994).  
28 See (Peirce, 1878), (Popper, 1957, 1959), (Suppes, 1987), and (Gillies, 2000). See also (Berkovitz, 2015) for a 
defense of the propensity interpretation of probability against the traditional twin criticisms that the explication of 
propensities is circular and therefore non-informative and that it is metaphysical and therefore non-scientific.  
29 It is important to realize that while the propensity is a property of the generating conditions,  the generating 
conditions are not a property of the propensity.  Different generating conditions may induce the same propensity.  
As we pointed out in footnote 17, there are two kinds of conditioning that occur in statistics and stochastic 
processes.  One can condition on a random variable, or one can condition on a fixed effect.  Conditioning on a 
random variable (B) restricts to a subset the sample space that the probability of the event A is being calculated over.  
Likewise conditioning on A restricts to a subset the sample space that the probability of B is being calculated over.  
However, if one conditions on a fixed effect B, the value of random variable A has no effect on the fixed effect 
because it is, well, fixed. The rules of probability that Humphreys (1985) found violated involve conditioning on 
random variables.  Considering propensity as a random distribution conditioned on fixed effects (i.e. generating 
conditions) avoids the Humphreys paradox.   
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2.2.3 Finite Empirical Frequencies 
      The empirical interpretations of probability championed by von Mises30 and Reichenbach31 
define probability in terms of the limits of relative frequencies in hypothetical infinite sequences 
of trials; but the empirical sequences we encounter in the world are always finite, and we have 
often good reason to suppose that they cannot be infinite. Although there are significant 
mathematical issues for that kind of idealization in their frequency interpretation, that is, that 
sequences are infinite, insofar as scientific experiments are concerned, this kind of idealization is 
implausible tout court. We cannot assume that in a physical experiment we have an infinite 
number of helium nuclei in various stages of excitation. Nor should we assume in any case that 
the probability operator is to be “defined” in frequency terms. Rather, finite frequency is no more 
than a way of estimating propensities in particular cases. Troublesome cases, such as assigning 
probabilities to single events, do not undermine an interpretation of “probability” so much as 
they raise difficulties for approximating values under certain conditions.  
  
Figure 1: Schematic representation for the relationships among kinds of probabilities in a 
statistical inference. In subjective Bayesian statistics, matching is measured by degrees of belief.  
In likelihood or evidential statistics, matching is measured through evidence. 
2.2.4 Combining Probabilities 
In other words, and in our view, it is not misleading to say that there are three distinct 
conceptions of objective probability – implicit, propensity, and finite frequency – although it 
would be more to our purposes  to say that these are “melded” aspects of a single interpretation 
of objective or non-credal probability. Likelihoods allow us to identify models whose implicit 
                                                          
30 See (von Mises, 1957) 
31 See (Reichenbach, 1949). 
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probabilities best match natural propensities as approximated by finite frequencies. Figure 1 
shows a schematic of the interplay of multiple features of probability in using statistics to make a 
scientific inference. We estimate the natural propensity expressed under specified conditions via 
the relative frequency of observations of various type under those conditions. We choose the 
model (theory) that best matches that finite frequency. This is the only way to make sense of the 
likelihood-based inference if a likelihoodist wants to connect her paradigm to empirical and real-
world applications. 
Bayesians select models with the highest posterior probability. Likelihoodists choose 
models by matching their implicit distributions with realized distributions; the model with the 
best match, i.e., maximum likelihood, is chosen. As the posterior probability is proportional to 
the product of the likelihood and the prior probability, one could say that the likelihood is being 
biased towards models of high prior probability.32  Alternatively, the posterior probability can be 
seen as a weighted distribution with the likelihood the weight function for prior distribution 
(Patil et al. 1986).  In this conceptualization, the prior is being biased towards models with high 
likelihood support.  Thus, under either conceptualization of the Bayesian approach, models are 
chosen on the basis of matching both to empirical frequencies and to prior probabilities.  In 
contrast, in the likelihoodist/evidentialist approach models are chosen only on the basis of 
matching to empirical frequencies. 
 We think that the melded probabilities invoked by likelihoodists and other evidentialists 
provide a case for their measure(s) being agent-independent in a realist as well as an invariant 
way, and thus “fully objective” (insofar as they are also taken as modeled propensities). Hence 
they are distinguished from subjective or credal belief-probabilities. Confirmation is in a 
fundamental sense “in the head,” evidence is in that same sense “in the world.” The 
fundamentally multiple interpretations of “probability” in credal and non-credal cases make this 
sense clearer.      
         
                                                          
32 Since the Bayesian will always choose the model with the higher posterior, if two models have the same 
likelihood, the Bayesian will choose the one with the higher prior. The primary implication would seem to be that 
model choice is no longer evidential, but belief-dependent. Often the difference will be small, but see Howson 
(2013, 2016) for an extended argument in behalf of the claim that in the case of certain “gerrymandered” hypotheses 
(e.g., that Santa Claus wills a sequence of 100 coin-flips that in every case come up heads), it will and should be 
very large and our reply to same (2016). 
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2.3 Bayesian and Evidential Accounts’ of the Decision Question 
       For subjective Bayesians the answer to the decision question, “given the data what should 
we do?” flows naturally from their answer to the confirmation question. Subjective Bayesians 
answer the question by invoking the idea of maximizing expected utility which accommodates 
both the posterior probability of states of nature given by Prci (i = 1,2) and the utility of having 
some “wealth” in each state Wi (i = 1,2) given by Uj = Uj(W) of doing an action j.  Assuming 
that there are only two mutually exclusive actions, A1, and A2, we apply the expected utility 
formula E(Uj) = (1-Prc1) Uj(W1) + Prc2 Uj(W2) for each action and then  choose the action which 
has the maximum expected utility. For a Bayesian, the expected utility of an act depends on both 
her subjective posterior probability for that act and the utility of opting for that act. In short, the 
Bayesian response to the decision question is that for any set of options one should always 
choose the act that maximizes her expected utility, when the expectation is taken over the 
posterior distribution of her belief after all data have  been taken into account. 
     An evidential account of the decision question can be developed paralleling the Bayesian 
approach.  The distinction between the two concerns the probability distribution over which the 
expectation of utility is calculated.   An evidential calculation identifies which state of potential 
nature is best supported by the data.  Associated with each evidential assessment is a probability 
(ML) that the evidence has been misleading.33 ML is called the probability of misleading 
evidence because it is evidence for the false hypothesis. It is not a credal probability, but is a 
quantity derived from the data-generating properties of the models involved34.  The utility 
expectation is taken over the distribution of probabilities that the states are correctly identified.  
     Revisiting the two state-of-nature cases mentioned above in the discussion of Bayesian 
decisions, let us index the states so that state best supported by data has index 1.  The evidential 
expected utility of an action j is given as: E(Uj) = (1- ML) Uj(W1) + ML Uj(W2).  To reiterate, 
                                                          
33 Note that ML is the local or post-data probability of misleading evidence discussed by Taper and Lele (2011), not 
the global or pre-data probability of misleading evidence of Royall (1997). 
34 ML might also be estimated as a finite frequency through a statistical non-parametric bootstrap of the model 
identification process.  The usefulness of the bootstrap for ML estimation, particularly in the presence of model 
misspecification, is developed in another publication currently under review. 
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the distinction here is that this evidential decision weights utility with a non-credal probability as 
opposed to the Bayesian decision where the weighting is credal.35 
 
2.4 An Evidential Account of the Prediction Question 
     It has been claimed (e.g., Taper & Ponciano 2016) that the PQ is not an evidential question 
sensu stricto.  Here we argue that the PQ can be seen as a species of the evidence question.  To 
continue the discussion, we need to be precise as to what “predictive accuracy” means.36 The 
model with the lowest mean-squared error of prediction (MSPE), say as measured by cross-
validation, is commonly considered the most predictively accurate.  For models with normally 
distributed errors, 1/MSPE can be readily seen as a biased estimate of the expected log-
likelihood (ELL) of a predicted observation.  Thus the expected log-likelihood can be viewed as 
a generalization of the MSPE as a measure of predictive accuracy. The model with the greatest 
expected log-likelihood is considered the most accurate.  The observed log-likelihood is a biased 
estimate of n*ELL, with the amount of bias depending on the sample size (n), the number of 
parameters estimated (k), and the true process generating the data.   
     Akaike (1973) showed that if the AIC value for the ith model is defined as 2(-LLi+ki) then the 
differences of AIC values Δi  is an approximately unbiased estimate of the difference in the ELL 
of the two models.  This approximation is very good if both models are fairly close to the true 
process.37 Another and equally valid description of the AIC is that the model selected minimizes 
the expected difference, as measured by the Kullback-Leibler (1951) divergence (KL), between 
the true distribution and the model estimated distribution. These two descriptions of the AIC 
indicate that (1) comparison of models by the AIC directly answers the PQ, and (2) the 
comparison is evidential in nature in that it is made by contrasting data-based estimates of a 
divergence of models from truth. 
                                                          
35 It was noted in footnote 32, and should be repeated, that one might take a Bayesian stance with respect to model 
choice and yet maintain as we do here that the probability of the data on a given model is non-credal. 
36 Bayesians are also capable of addressing the PQ.  
37 The true process is of course and unfortunately unknown.  Akaike (1973) brilliantly showed that despite this the 
relative distance (divergence) between two models and truth can still be estimated.  Mathematically, this is because 
the effect of the true process, being common to all models, can be eliminated though the contrasts of information 
criterion values (see Taper and Ponciano 2016b for a detailed exposition).  
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     For clarity, let us revisit our coin flipping example.  The model set is now reduced to two 
members: M1 in which we assume the coin is fair, (i.e., the parameter is set to 0.05 without 
estimation), and M2 where we estimate the probability of heads on a coin toss from the data.  The 
maximum likelihood estimate of this parameter is 0.58.  The AIC value for M1 is 3.80 while the 
value for M2 is 4.52.  Thus for this data an AIC comparison indicates that although the difference 
is slight for predictive accuracy, you are better off continuing to assume a fair coin. 
     It has been claimed (e.g., Taper and Ponciano 2016a) that, in apparent contrast to this 
analysis, differences of AIC values are not “evidence functions.” The claim is both correct and 
incorrect. The technical definition of evidence functions (see Lele 2004) has a consistency 
requirement that the model selected by an evidence function should converge (in probability) to 
the true model (or its best approximation in the model set) as sample size increases.  AIC model 
selection does not behave in this fashion.  It is well known that the AIC makes many over-fitting 
errors even at large sample size (Taper 2004).  AIC model selection does not converge to the true 
model (or its best approximation in the model set) as sample size increases.  So, the correct part 
of Taper and Ponciano’s (2016a) claim is that AIC model selection is not a consistent estimator 
of causal processes because it is unable to find the true model required for estimating causal 
processes as the sample size increases. 
        However, AIC was never designed to be an estimator of causal processes.  Therefore, the 
incorrect or misleading part of their claim is that AIC estimates true causal processes. It was 
designed to answer what in our view is a different question, which model will have the highest 
predictive accuracy? Despite its tendency to over-fit in terms of the number of parameters, AIC 
model selection is consistent for the quantity of interest in the PQ question.  The predictive 
accuracy of the model selected by AIC converges to the predictive accuracy of the true model (or 
its best approximation in the model set) as sample size increases towards infinity (Stone 1977, 
1979).  So, AIC model selection is a consistent estimator of the model with the best predictive 
accuracy.  
     Clearly, the AIC is operating in a very evidential fashion in its comparison of models through 
estimated distances. However, it steps just outside the technical definition of an evidence 
function by seeking to answer the prediction question rather than the evidence question. Here the 
philosophical analysis has outstripped the statistics and remains a desideratum for further 
20 
 
research regarding  an extension of the technical definition of evidence to include evidence for 
features, functions and functionals of models, and not just for models themselves.   
 
2.5 The Decision and Prediction Accounts and Probability Interpretation Complexity 
       A combination of different probability interpretations is going to occur in applications of 
Bayesian and AIC frameworks to DQ and PQ that is similar to what we came across in section 2 
in the accounts of confirmation and evidence. Recall the Bayesian framework is designed to 
address the decision question and AIC framework to address the prediction question.      
    To address DQ, Bayesians apply the idea of maximization of expected utility, which combines 
an agent’s posterior probability for an action with her expected utility from choosing it. Hence, 
the agent’s posterior probability has been used in a particularly significant fashion. We argued 
that the Bayesian calculation of the posterior probability mixes both credal probability (prior 
probability) and objective likelihood functions. Therefore, mixing two types of probability 
interpretations also becomes vital for Bayesians addressing the DQ. 
    Recall how AIC addressed the PQ. Insofar as melding of different probability interpretations is 
concerned, since the AIC framework is a penalty function plus a log-likelihood function and 
some constants, the AIC framework will behave exactly like the likelihood function for the 
likelihoodist’s account as discussed in section 2. 
      To summarize, the Bayesian response to the Decision Question mixes subjective or credal 
and objective or non-credal probabilities, as the evidentialist’s response to the Prediction 
Question melds different objective features together in a single non-credal account in the same 
way in which the two parallel responses to the Confirmation and Evidence Questions similarly 
mix and meld. 
3 Further Corollaries 
     Towards the end of his foundational essay, Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective 
Sources38, De Finetti has this to say: 
Two completely opposed points of view [on the meaning and the value of the notion of 
probability]: the first, the most commonly accepted, considers the subjective element of 
                                                          
38 English translation from the original French (1937) in Kyburg and Smokler (1964). 
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the naïve notion of probability which is found in our everyday life as a dangerous 
element which ought to be eliminated in order that the notion of probability be able to 
attain a truly scientific status; the opposite point of view considers…that the subjective 
elements are essential, and cannot be eliminated without depriving the notion and theory 
of probability of all reason for existing….Both of these two points of view seek to give a 
well-defined meaning to probability statements, but the domains in which these concepts 
should receive a meaning are completely different” (p. 149). 
We agree that the two conceptions of “probability” differ in essential ways, but contend at the 
same time that they find, indeed must find, conjoined application to perhaps their most time-
honored and well-defined domain, that of statistical inference. For as we have argued in this 
paper, statistical inference correctly understood in light of distinctions between four fundamental 
questions that such inference is designed to answer must employ both of these conceptions. 
Indeed, and in sharp contrast to De Finetti and his many followers, the Bayesian paradigm mixes 
intuitively “objective” with similarly “subjective” elements, and the likelihood paradigm melds 
rather different conceptions of how “objectivity” is itself to be understood.39    
     We are not the first to touch upon the complexity of probability interpretation in statistical 
inference. In a recent book, Elliott Sober (2015) writes, “the idea of each school [i.e., Bayesians 
and Frequentists being] wedded to a single interpretation of probability is too simple.” (p.62, 
emphasis added.) However, we have extended this discussion concerning complexity of 
probability interpretation in two ways. First, we showed how different statistical schools must 
necessarily incorporate more than one probability interpretation to undertake statistical inference. 
Second, we extended the complexity of probability interpretation to different questions 
concerning statistical inference and decision-making. What sort of mixed or melded 
interpretation one needs to use for practical purposes is contingent on what general type of 
question one is asking. To repeat: our pluralism is principled. If we are asking the confirmation 
question, then the account of confirmation combines both subjective and objective interpretations 
                                                          
39 De Finetti identifies the objective conception with the limiting frequency interpretation of probability, contrasts 
it point by point with his own subjectivist view, and goes on to underline several of its difficulties. Interestingly, 
however, the title of his essay suggests an identification of “objective” with “logical,” and thus is closer to our own 
view, on which probability is a logical relationship between data and models, the empirical content of which is 
estimated in terms of relative (if not also limiting) frequencies and whose explanatory value is to be understood in 
terms of the causal powers or propensities of physical objects to behave in certain ways in particular kinds of 
experimental set-ups.  
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of the probability operators within it. When the evidence question is posed, the Likelihoodist 
melds three conceptions of “objective probability.” If the question is about a decision to make, 
then the Bayesian decision-theoretic account which includes the posterior probability needs to 
invoke both subjective and objective probabilities as in the case of the account of confirmation. 
When the decision question is approached from an evidential perspective, only a melding of 
different types of objective probabilities is required. When the Evidentialist is asking the 
prediction question, since the AIC framework is a combination of a likelihood function plus a 
bias correction in the form of a penalty function, the AIC framework is reducible to the 
Likelihoodist’s, which melds three types or, perhaps less misleadingly, aspects of objective 
probability.  The strongest claim we made is that even with regard to a single question, one has 
to deploy a mixture or melding of different types or aspects of probability. Failure to recognize 
this fact is perhaps the main source of the unending and unnecessary ‘statistics wars” that have 
plagued discussions of important methodological questions having to do with model testing40. 
Charges of “subjectivity” and claims of “objectivity” are tossed around without an adequately 
nuanced understanding of how they are best to be understood. Perhaps the chief implication of 
our discussion is that these terms, at least on their traditional and vague readings, have outlived 
their usefulness. Our time is better served in focusing on such distinctions as that between 
evidence and confirmation.41 
     That said, on our view there are two further and rather closely-related corollaries to draw 
from our discussion. 
     The first corollary has to do with so-called “Bayesian convergence.” It is worth quoting 
Hawthorne at some length in this connection. 
If Bayesian induction is to yield either an objective assessment or intersubjective agreement 
among the agents regarding the inductive support for hypotheses, then the evidence must 
somehow produce a convergence to agreement among the posterior probabilities of different 
Bayesian agents in spite of their initial disagreements about the possibilities of these 
                                                          
40 Our Monograph (2016) discuss extensively the conflation of confirmation and evidence in the philosophical 
literature and the untoward consequences to which it leads. 
41 In the same way that the distinctions we have drawn are beginning to reform applied statistical inference (see 
footnote 10 above), we hope that these same distinctions will reform philosophical understanding of same. Our 
aim here has been to move in a decisive way beyond the discussions of “objectivity”/”subjectivity” in the work of 
Hacking and Gilles cited in footnote 1. 
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hypotheses. Hence, advocates of Bayesian induction have investigated the circumstances 
under which evidence might “washout” the effects of subjective priors and bring agents into 
agreement on posterior probabilities. Bayesian convergence theorems establish conditions 
under which accumulating evidence can induce agents to converge to agreement (1994, p. 
241). 
Various conditions, event-exchangeability (order-insensitivity and value-replacement of 
experimental outcomes) and certain lesser-known others have been invoked, and the point at 
which convergence is reached depends on certain crucial assumptions, in particular on the size of 
the data set,42 the identifiability of the models considered, and the suppression of what Kyburg 
calls “pig-headed priors.”43 From our point of view it does not really matter, for the idea that 
“Bayesian convergence” guarantees “objectivity” in the needed sense of the word is misleading.  
On the one hand, objectivity is here equated with “intersubjective agreement,” which is to 
say that for all of the “consensus” involved, the probability is not agent-independent. However 
much the prior probabilities of individual agents might “wash out” numerically as data 
accumulate, the calculation of posterior probabilities via Bayes Theorem still must include 
reference to them in principle. Priors converge only by way of successive up-datings.44 
“Agreement” is never more than that, a concurrence among beliefs, a shared disposition to 
operate with the same posteriors.  
On the other hand, and more importantly, there is something unacceptably vague as well 
as powerfully suggestive about the asymptotic intuition embedded in the notion of Bayesian 
convergence. For it leads naturally if not also logically to the conclusion that as confirming data 
are accumulated, the hypothesis is a closer and closer approximation to the way things stand in 
the world. But this Whiggish suggestion is hostage to the history of science; Newton’s theory of 
motion was highly confirmed by data accumulated over almost 200 years and well-nigh 
universally accepted as true, but although a good approximation for practical purposes to the way 
things stand, it is not nearly so good an approximation as Einstein’s to the way things “really” 
stand. Even when the point is made in a more Bayesian spirit, by saying that as confirming data 
for a particular hypothesis or model are accumulated, agents have stronger and stronger reasons 
                                                          
42 Hawthorne uses “evidence” synonymously with “data,” as we do not. 
43 (1983, p. 67). 
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to believe that it is true, it continues to face the fact that the hypothesis is nonetheless strictly 
false. Confidence may be raised, even to the point of near-certainty, when it is in hindsight 
unwarranted. Bayesians sometimes try to avoid this unwelcome conclusion by stretching out “in 
the long run.” 200 years is no more than a drop in the bucket of time. Agreed, but Keynes’ 
celebrated remark to the effect that in the long run we are all dead applies as effectively to the 
history of science as it does to economic forecasting. Bayesian model identification only 
converges to truth if the “true” model is in your model set. Otherwise, convergence is just to the 
best model in the model set, with best model being defined as the model with the smallest 
Kullback-Leibler divergence to the generating process or “true model.” 
     The second corollary of our earlier discussion of confirmation and evidence helps explain the 
first. Bayesian confirmation considers hypotheses one at a time; they are believed-true to the 
degree to which subsequent data-collection raises or lowers their posterior probabilities. Its 
calculations do not take into account the possibility of alternative hypotheses that could match 
the data to an even greater degree, where “match the data” entails that the data are more likely on 
the alternative, that is, provide better evidence for it45. It’s important to note in this connection 
that “better evidence” does not mean “closer to the truth,” still less “should be believed.” For the 
context is always truth- and belief-free. D provides better evidence for H than for H’ if and only 
if D are more likely on H than on H’ from which it does not follow that H is more likely to be 
true.. There is no commitment to the belief that a particular model is true.   
     The underlying problem was characterized succinctly by the statistician G.A. Barnard (1949): 
To speak of the probability of a hypothesis implies the possibility of an exhaustive 
enumeration of all possible hypotheses, which implies a degree of rigidity foreign to the 
true scientific spirit. We should always admit the possibility that our experimental results 
may be best accounted for by a hypothesis which never entered our own heads. 
In the present context, his point might be rephrased in this way: Bayesian convergence 
presupposes an initial probability distribution with respect to which subsequent up-dating takes 
place, but there is and can be no guarantee that the initial distribution has among its members the 
                                                          
45 See pages 69-70 of Bandyophadyay, Brittan, and Taper (2016) for more extended discussion. 
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model that best accounts for the experimental results, which may be outside the model set.46 It is 
important to note that Barnard does not say that the unconsidered model must be “closer to the 
truth.”  
In discussing Bayesian convergence we have, perhaps inevitably and in reference to 
Peirce, rather casually introduced the notion of “truth” and committed Bayesian confirmation 
theory to what is sometimes called the “true-model in model set” assumption.  Our critique of 
this assumption might give the impression that we are also criticizing the idea that the goal of 
scientific experimentation, model-building, and inference is the discovery of the truth. But this is 
misleading for at least two reasons. First, although we are skeptical about all claims that one or 
another hypothesis or model is (really) true, we have no reason to be skeptical about the notion 
of truth itself, still less any reason to reduce or replace it.47 
          As necessary as objective evidence is for the communication and interpretation of 
scientific results, the discovery of scientific results generally begins in the subjective.  Often the 
word “intuition” is introduced at this point. Such intuition gives rise to thought experiments – 
famously in the cases of Galileo, Newton, and Einstein – which in turn suggest hypotheses or 
models, which in a further turn are put to experimental test – rolling balls down inclined planes 
or measuring tidal motions or placing the Michelson-Morley experiment in a new context. 
Science, as for that matter does everyday experience, begins with prior probability distributions 
over outcomes of possible courses of actions. A scientist begins with a plausible idea, refine it as 
a hypothesis/model, and proceed to see what data are probable on it and to what extent they 
confirm it48. A wise scientist, guided both by an understanding of her own fallibility and by a 
                                                          
46 In the personal decision context, the Barnard objection is less serious than in the confirmation or evidence 
context.  Action is being taken based on a choice among a finite set of models.  The belief represented in the prior 
probability is not so much a belief in the truth of the model, but a belief that a model is the best in a limited set.  
Problems arise for Bayesian decision theory when public or group decisions are considered.  As we have 
mentioned above, the posterior distribution is biased towards the prior.  Whoever controls the prior has an 
untoward influence on the decision.  An evidence of maximum utility decision procedure along the lines we have 
discussed would avoid this problem, and is worth further research.  
 
47 The concept of belief is incomprehensible without it. 
48 Kyburg and Meng (2001, pp. 201-202) ask an appropriate question, “what do we need probability for?” and 
then, echoing Bishop Butler (1692-1752), answer it: “We want probability as a guide in life. For it to function as a 
guide, we require it to be objective rather than subjective. Two agents sharing the same evidence – that is, 
agreeing on the same objective facts about the world – should assign the same probabilities.” From our point of 
view, the answer is much too sweeping, wrongly assimilates data and evidence, and somewhat ironically makes a 
case for an exclusively “objective” conception of probability. For if probability is to be the very guide in life it has to 
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desire for rhetorical power to convince others, then asks what other models could explain the 
phenomena and what data could discriminate among her models. 
This emphasis on the necessity of a jointly subjective-objective account of statistical 
inference mirrors Kant’s account of experience in the Critique of Pure Reason. What could be 
taken as his main theme is that a purely subjective - empiricist or idealist - account is 
fundamentally incoherent. The concept of the self as a subject of experience requires as a 
condition of its application an objective world in which that subject can be located and on which 
it has a temporally-extended perspective. There is no “I” without an “it,” no subject of 
experience without an object of experience, no adequate account of statistical inference without 
both confirmation and evidence. The subject and the subjective come into play for Kant when 
human action is at stake. Which is to say that the Bayesian paradigm is uniquely well-suited as 
an answer to the personal decision question, “what should I do?”49  
The subjective probabilities can also apply to the question of model choice. The 
expression “model choice,” deeply entrenched in the literature, is ambiguous and depends on the 
reason for which a choice is desired. It is almost always used to mean something like belief in or 
acceptance of a model on the basis of its confirmatory or evidential superiority, something after-
the-fact. But we think that it is also appropriately applied to the act of choosing which models to 
put to experimental test, before any data have been accumulated in a systematic way. This is 
where prior probabilities play an indispensable role. De Finetti gets at this, or at least can be 
taken as getting at something like this.50 
Rather than by seeking to bring everything back to the objective, one can attain clarity by 
reducing any such concept systematically to the subjective; the value of a concept would 
then result from the analysis of the deep and essential reasons which have made us, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
be connected to action by way of belief and normative in character. That is, probability is a “guide” insofar as it 
offers an account of what should be believed on the basis of what we have experienced. But of course this is 
precisely what the Bayesian account, eschewed by Kyburg and Meng, does. The limitations with the Bayesian 
account of probability lie in a different direction. To put it as briefly as possible, it doesn’t capture or quantify the 
uncertainty embedded in our statistical inferences, intrinsic elements of our scientific world-view, and 
uneliminable dimensions of our lived experience.  To say that probabilities can never have 0 or 1 as their values 
doesn’t begin to scratch these just-mentioned surfaces.         
49 The fact that the Bayesian probabilifier is routinely identified as an “agent” hints at this; the Bayesian agent 
collects data, up-dates posteriors, makes decisions concerning the initial distribution of probabilities over models. 
So far as evidence is concerned, there is no “doing,” no temporal-intervals, no agent. 
50 The word “sources” in the title of his essay connotes the genesis of hypotheses, not their assessment. 
27 
 
perhaps unconsciously, introduce it, and which furnish us with the explanation of its 
usefulness (Kyburg and Smokler, p.149). 
.  
4 Conclusion 
     We have not argued that the Subjective Bayesian position is wrong-headed. Our view is that 
its account of confirmation is an indispensable component of an adequate account of personal 
epistemology and decision. All we claim is that a thoroughly objective account of evidence must 
be added to it for the public epistemology of scientific inference.  At least two statistical 
paradigms and multiple interpretations of probability are necessary. Their respective tasks can, as 
we have tried to show, be set out in a principled way. 
     
     This is, of course, not the end of the matter. It is one thing to distinguish between types or 
aspects of interpretations of probability, and to note the distinction syntactically, and another to 
make each adequately clear. There are various axiomatizations of belief and propensity 
probability concepts,51 but not yet general agreement on which axioms should be taken as 
standard. Indeed, there is no longer general agreement that the Kolmogorov axioms constitute 
the essential core of any adequate explication of these concepts.52  
     So far as we can see, our argument in this paper does not depend on settling any of these 
questions here. It is enough to show here that within the Bayesian paradigm there is a mixing of 
credal and non-credal concepts of probability, and that within the evidentialist paradigm a 
melding of different non-credal components, and that the two paradigms are indispensable both 
in making clear the distinction between evidence and confirmation and in indicating the ways in 
which what we call the decision and prediction questions are to be addressed. That noted, a 
further sharpening of the argument is necessary. But there is enough here on the basis of which 
to refine statistical practice and reform philosophical understanding, on the one hand in drawing 
distinctions, e.g., between confirmation and evidence, the neglect of which leads to confusion, 
and on the other in being persuaded that the labeling and subsequent criticism of one or another 
statistical paradigm as “subjective” or “objective” is to paint with too broad and misleading a 
                                                          
51 As an example of the former see (Crupi, et. al., 2013), of the latter see (Suppes. 1973). 
52 See (Hájek, 2012). 
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brush. One must proceed in a more principled and particular way. Or so we have tried to 
demonstrate.         
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